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TOP TEN REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PRIVACY
JORDAN M. BLANKE *
ABSTRACT
Much has been written about the demise of privacy. There is no doubt that
the notion of privacy has changed dramatically and continues to evolve.
All, however, is not doom and gloom. While technology and societal
changes have radically altered the environment in which privacy must survive, the same basic human needs and values continue to transform it into
a new shape. Some of the momentum comes from the law itself, some from
the business world, some from societal values, and some from new emphases in research. This paper will discuss the top ten reasons to be optimistic
about the future of privacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems like we have been hearing about the death of privacy for a long time.
From Scott McNealy’s proclamation in 1999 that “[y]ou have zero privacy anyway.
. . . Get over it” 1 to Mark Zuckerberg’s declaration in 2010 that privacy is no longer

* Ernest L. Baskin, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Computer Science and Law at the Stetson
School of Business and Economics at Mercer University in Atlanta.
1. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: “Get Over It,” WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999, 12:00 PM), http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538.
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a social norm; 2 from privacy legislation’s relegation to the back burner after 9/11; 3
to the utter failure of the notice and consent model on the Web. 4 While there is no
doubt that privacy is very different than it was a generation or two ago, all is not
doom and gloom. There are some glimmers of hope.
Obviously, the notion of privacy has evolved tremendously in the past several
decades. As society changes – often driven by new technology – the law evolves. It
must. As Professor Neil Richards argued in his classic article Four Privacy Myths,
privacy is not dead and young people do care about their privacy. 5 While the technocentric world that young people have grown up in certainly differs from the world
of just a few years ago, they are likely far more savvy about how to navigate that
world and how to protect their privacy. 6
In this article, I have compiled a list of ten reasons to be optimistic about the
future of privacy. I have tried to put them in an order of increasing importance, but
there no doubt, will be room for differing opinions regarding that order. One of the
things that I tried to do is weigh both the significance of the item as well as the
likelihood of it happening. For example, if the Katz test were to be completely overhauled by the Supreme Court, making it the one-prong objective test it should have
been for the past fifty years, it would be tremendously important. 7 However, the
likelihood of that happening is very small. Here are the top ten reasons to be optimistic about the future of privacy:
10. CRIMINAL PRIVACY LAWS ARE FINALLY BEING USED MORE
Despite the fact that there have been criminal sanctions for various forms of
computer misuse and invasion of privacy for decades, there has been relatively little
use of those statutes. 8 It appears that this is beginning to change.

2. Marshall Kilpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy is Over, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10,
2010),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/external/reawriteweb/2010/01/10/10r
eadwriteweb-facebooks-zuckerberg-says-the-age-of-privac-82963.html.
3. Daniel Klau, Privacy, Security, and the Legacy of 9/11, UCONN TODAY (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://today.uconn.edu/2015/09/privacy-security-and-the-legacy-of-911/; Jason Noble, U.S. Debates Security vs. Privacy 12 Years After 9/11, USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:11 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/10/us-debates-security-vs-privacy-12-years-after-911/2796399/.
4. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Norton, Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and
Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 490–96 (2015); Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, (Oct. 2009), https://nissenbaum.tech.cornell.edu/papers/ED_SII_On_Notice.pdf.
5. Neil M. Richards, Four Privacy Myths, SSRN (Apr. 24, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li & Joseph Turow, How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies?
(Apr.
14,
2010),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/
SSRN
delivery.php?ID=85700507103102600308207112211711600004003202003100305408511912209608100
202311300206405411400103706210401403001200912410906702503301601008105911202900308707
011906508608208402508609201008403012706506908709010008909506802807402007512408010911
2065000067&EXT=pdf.
6. Richards, supra note 5, at 16–18.
7. See infra notes 40–68 and accompanying text.
8. Jordan M. Blanke, Criminal Invasion of Privacy: A Survey of Computer Crimes, 41 JURIMETRICS
443, 456 (2001).
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Arizona and Florida passed the first “computer crime” statutes in 1978. 9 Georgia, Virginia, and West Virginia passed the first criminal invasion of privacy statutes
in 1999 and 2000. 10 The federal government enacted the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act in 1984 11 and amended it with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) in 1986. 12 We are finally beginning to see more prosecutions under these
statutes.
There have been several well-publicized hacking or phishing incidents involving celebrity photographs in recent years. When two nude selfies of Scarlett Johansson were published on the Web in 2011, the most effective and immediate remedy
was for her to use the “takedown” provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. 13 Because she took the selfies and was the owner thereof, Johannsson could
have threatened liability under the copyright law for web sites that did not respond
to her notice by immediately removing the photographs from their web sites. 14 Privacy statutes do not provide similar protection. Johannsson would not have been
able to use the “takedown” provision of the copyright law had she not been the
author and owner of the copyright-protected work. 15 Obviously, quite often the
subject of the offending photograph is not the author and is, therefore, unable to
avail themselves of that provision.
While Johansson’s use of copyright law resulted in the removal of her photographs from many more web sites than if she had threatened merely to sue for
invasion of privacy, it is encouraging to see some computer crime statutes now being used to prosecute the hackers. 16 In the aftermath of this episode, dubbed Operation Hackerazzi by the press, the perpetrator of the breach was prosecuted under two sections of the CFAA, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to the maximum
ten years in prison. 17 The court found that Johansson, and several other celebrities,

9. Id. at 449. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301(E), 13-2316 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. §§ 815.01–
815.07 (West 1999).
10. See Blanke, supra note 8, at 451; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(c) (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-152.5 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-12 (West 2000).
11. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
12. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986).
13. See Christopher Satti, A Call to (Cyber) Arms: Applicable Statutes and Suggested Courses of
Action for the Celebrity iCloud Hacking Scandal, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 561, 579–88 (2016); Jessica E. Easterly,
Terror in Tinseltown: Who is Accountable When Hollywood Gets Hacked, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 332–37
(2016); Jordan M. Blanke, Privacy and Outrage, 9 J.L., TECH. & INTERNET 1, 10–11 (2018).
14. Under Section 512(g)(1) of Title 17 of the United States Code, “a service provider shall not be
liable to any person for any claim based on the service providers’ good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material . . . regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1) (2010). The use of this so-called “DCMA takedown notice” has become extremely
common. As long as a web host removes the allegedly infringing work, this “safe harbor” provision will protect it from liability. See Easterly, supra note 13, at 358–59.
15. Section 512(b)(2)(E) permits the owner of a copyrighted work to make such a claim. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(b)(2)(E) (2010).
16. David Kravets, Scarlett Johansson Hacker Gets 10 Years, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2012, 6:12 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2012/12/scarlett-johansson-hacker/.
17. See Satti, supra note 13, at 580–81; see also Easterly, supra note 13, at 348.
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had suffered both economic loss and severe emotional distress. 18 An FBI agent involved in the case likened the defendant’s actions to the “breaking and entering of
[the celebrities’] private homes by a thief in the night.” 19
Similarly, in what widely became known as The Fappening, and as a result of
multiple phishing scams, nude photographs of many celebrities were again leaked
to the Web in 2014. 20 One of the celebrities involved was Jennifer Lawrence, whose
representative threatened that authorities would “prosecute anyone who posts the
stolen photos.” 21 Two men were successfully prosecuted under a section of the
CFAA prohibiting the unauthorized access of a protected computer. 22 One received
a sentence of eighteen months in prison and the other nine months. 23
Part of the reason for more successful prosecution under computer crime statutes is likely attributable to evolving societal views regarding privacy: “[b]eloved
figures like Jennifer Lawrence, made vulnerable by having their naked bodies nonconsensually exposed to the world, are . . . sympathetic characters[.]” 24 Public outrage about some of the more egregious breaches of privacy are starting to shape a
new sense of what should and should not be permitted in our digital world. 25 Other
examples include the trends towards banning revenge porn 26 and upskirt photography. 27
9. INFLUENCE OF CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY RESEARCH
In 2004 Helen Nissenbaum wrote the landmark article Privacy as Contextual
Integrity. 28 It has been arguably the most influential article ever written about privacy in terms of shaping the direction of privacy research and its literature. Many
of the article’s basic propositions have spawned numerous other articles in a variety
of disciplines. 29
18. Satti, supra note 13, at 580.
19. Id. at 580–81.
20. Easterly, supra note 13, at 334.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 349.
23. Alan Yuhas, Hacker Who Stole Nude Photos of Celebrities Gets 18 Months in Prison, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 27, 2016, 7:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/27/nude-celebrity-photoshacker-prison-sentence-ryan-collins; ASSOC. PRESS, Chicago Man Gets 9 Months in Celebrity Nude Photo
Hack, USA TODAY (Jan. 24, 2017, 6:21 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2017/01/24/chicago-man-gets-9-months-celebrity-nude-photo-hack/97011632/.
24. Easterly, supra note 13, at 345. See infra notes 118–37 and accompanying text.
25. See Blanke, supra note 13, at 9–17.
26. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography,
102 IOWA L. REV. 709 (2017); see also 41 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2019) (Forty-one states and
Washington, D.C. have now passed revenge porn laws).
27. Blanke, supra note 13, at 11–12; Marc Tran, Combatting Gender Privilege and Recognizing a
Woman’s Right to Privacy in Public Spaces: Arguments to Criminalize Catcalling and Creepshots, 26 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (2016). See generally Jeffrey T. Marvin, Without a Bright-Line on a Green Line: How Commonwealth v. Robertson Failed to Criminalize Upskirt Photography, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 119 (2015).
28. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004).
29. Hundreds of law journal articles have written about contextual integrity. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin and Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
339 (2016). A special issue of Ohio State’s I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society was
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The first part of Nissenbaum’s article presented the three basic principles that
had dominated discussion of privacy: “(1) limiting surveillance of citizens and use of
information about them by agents of government, (2) restricting access to sensitive,
personal, or private information, and (3) curtailing intrusions into places deemed
private or personal.” 30 The second part of her paper described privacy in terms of
“contextual integrity.” 31
A central tenet of contextual integrity is that there are no arenas of life not
governed by norms of information flow, no information or spheres of life
for which “anything goes.” Almost everything—things that we do, events
that occur, transactions that take place—happens in a context not only of
place but of politics, convention, and cultural expectation . . . .
Each of these spheres, realms, or contexts involves, indeed may even be
defined by, a distinct set of norms, which governs its various aspects such
as roles, expectations, actions, and practices. For certain contexts, such as
the highly ritualized settings of many church services, these norms are explicit and quite specific. For others, the norms may be implicit, variable,
and incomplete . . . .
Contexts, or spheres, offer a platform for a normative account of privacy
in terms of contextual integrity. As mentioned before, contexts are partly
constituted by norms, which determine and govern key aspects such as
roles, expectations, behaviors, and limits. There are numerous possible
sources of contextual norms, including history, culture, law, convention,
etc. Among the norms present in most contexts are ones that govern information, and, most relevant to our discussion, information about the
people involved in the contexts. I posit two types of informational norms:
norms of appropriateness, and norms of flow or distribution. Contextual
integrity is maintained when both types of norms are upheld, and it is violated when either of the norms is violated. 32
Nissenbaum proposed that contextual integrity set up a “presumption in favor
of the status quo; common practices are understood to reflect norms of appropriateness and flow, and breaches of these norms are held to be violations of privacy.” 33 She discussed how the status quo of norms regarding information flows
could be challenged for sufficient reason, but that there would need to be a balancing with relevant social, political, and moral values. 34 Among the important privacy

devoted to contextual integrity. VOL. 13 I/S J. L. & POL’Y (2017). Nissenbaum and others wrote an article surveying the computer science literature for applications of contextual integrity. Sebastian Benthall, Seda
Gürses & Helen Nissenbaum, Contextual Integrity Through the Lens of Computer Science, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS
PRIVACY & SEC. 1 (2017).
30. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 125.
31. Id. at 136–56.
32. Id. at 137–38.
33. Id. at 145.
34. Id. at 146–47.
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values presented were prevention of informational harms, informational equality,
autonomy and freedom, and preservation of important human relationships. 35
An example of an informational harm and a severe breach of contextual integrity was the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer. 36 A disturbed fan was able to
purchase a database containing Schaeffer’s home address from the Department of
Motor Vehicles. 37 The fan used the address to track her down and kill her. 38 Obviously, the information was not provided to the DMV by Schaeffer with an expectation that it could be purchased by private individuals. The incident caused a change
in law prohibiting such sales in the future.
Nissenbaum’s discussion of informational inequality presaged the proliferation of articles written about abuses and potential abuses of sophisticated use of
data analytics. 39 Her discussion of autonomy and freedom—or “the right to control
information about oneself” 40—is, obviously, a basic theme in privacy literature and
in privacy legislation. 41 Her discussion of the preservation of important human relationships and the role that trust plays in the ability to limit access to personal information has also spawned a number of articles on this topic. 42
One of the cases that Nissenbaum used to illustrate the application of contextual integrity involved an example of what has become one of the most difficult and
offending abuses of information flow—consumer profiling and data mining. She
stated that “the crucial issue is not whether the information is private or public,
gathered from private or public settings, but whether the action breaches contextual integrity.” 43 This is, if anything, truer and more important today. With the failure of a notice and consent scheme capable of protecting personal information,
coupled with the vast amounts of information already out there, the major hope
today is a regulatory scheme that limits subsequent use of information—and the
purposes for which the information can be used and the period of time it can be
retained. All of these speak to the contextual integrity of the information.
Nissenbaum’s article has been responsible for a generation of literature that
has built upon her basic propositions and informed the direction of much research
35. Id. at 147–50.
36. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 147; see also Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy
Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 826 (2007).
37. Paul Jacobs, Addresses at DMV Remain Accessible, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 19, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-19/news/mn-608_1_address-information.
38. Id.
39. See FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s
Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 267–81 (2016); Robert Sprague, Welcome to the Machine: Privacy
and Workplace Implications of Predictive Analysis, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2015); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating
the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 85 (2014); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Omer Tene &
Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 351 (2013).
40. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 149.
41. A major theme of one of today’s most significant pieces of legislation, the GDPR, is the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons with respect to the collection of their
personal data. See infra note 186.
42. See infra notes 138–53 and accompanying text.
43. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 152.
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that is occurring today. 44 Much of this literature will shape the direction of privacy
as it evolves in the near future.
8. REINTERPRETATION OF THE KATZ TEST
Ever since 1967 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States,
much of this country’s jurisprudence on privacy law has been the result of the twopronged test enunciated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion: “there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 45 Unfortunately, much of the fifty-year body of law is built
upon an erroneous interpretation of that test. It is impossible to truly understand
the Katz case without reading two excellent companion articles by Peter Winn and
Harvey Schneider. 46 Winn’s article, which reads more like a detective story than a
law journal article—and is befitting the underlying facts of the case, involving a
bookie living in an apartment on Sunset Boulevard—uncovers the story behind the
origin of the now-famous Katz test. 47 The proposed test was not mentioned in the
record of the lower courts nor in the briefs filed with the Supreme Court. 48 Rather,
the notion of an objective test based upon the tort law reasonable man standard
came as an epiphany to a twenty-nine-year-old lawyer during his preparation for
oral argument before the Supreme Court. 49
Schneider, who was the then twenty-nine-year-old lawyer, wrote that as he
prepared for oral argument, it dawned upon him that the proper argument and
questions were not about whether the FBI agents engaged in a trespass or whether
the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area, but rather “whether a reasonable person . . . could have expected his communication to be private.” 50 “The
test was an objective one, not the subjective test that had been . . .” discussed in the
briefs. 51 Schneider wrote that during oral argument, he made clear that what he
was proposing was an objective test. 52 He wrote that when Justice White “asked . .
. a question that seemed to suggest he was focusing on a subjective test,” he
(Schneider) responded that he was suggesting “an objective test of whether a third
party, looking at the overall scene, would arrive at that conclusion.” 53 Schneider
wrote about how he explained to the Court how he thought the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be applied:
We propose a test using a way that’s not too dissimilar from the tort “reasonable man” test . . . . [W]e would ask that the test be applied as to
44. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009); Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV.
13 (2009).
47. Winn, supra note 46.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id.
50. Schneider, supra note 46, at 19.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 20.

288

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 55

whether or not a third person objectively looking at the entire scene could
reasonably interpret, and could reasonably say, that the communicator intended his communication to be confidential. 54
Winn wrote about how the background and origin of the reasonable expectation of privacy test remained largely unknown for over forty years. 55 It was not until
the transcripts of the oral arguments of Supreme Court cases became available
online that this story came to light. 56 Winn wrote that while listening to the oral
arguments,
one cannot help but sense the electricity in the air as he [Schneider] presented the test for the first time to the public. The justices seized on the
test like children with a new toy, ran through various hypothetical fact situations, and then tested it against common intuitions of privacy norms. 57
Winn wrote that, during the oral argument, Schneider repeatedly “emphasized the objective nature of the test.” 58 Nonetheless these exchanges were largely
ignored and the Katz test took on a life of its own—one that was likely very different
than the one proposed for it at its conception.
In a 2015 article, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 59 Orin Kerr made two important points: 1) in the vast majority of cases that
have applied the Katz test over the years, the vast majority apply only the objective
test, and 2) Justice Harlan very likely never intended that there be a second-prong,
a subjective inquiry. 60 Regarding the first point, Kerr did an empirical study of the
540 cases that used the Katz test, and concluded that very few even attempted the
second part of the test. 61
The results of the study suggest that the subjective prong of Katz is irrelevant. A majority of cases applying Katz did not mention subjective expectations. Only 12 percent of Katz cases purported to apply the subjective
test. Only 2 percent of Katz cases claimed to hinge their analysis on the
subjective test. 62
Regarding the second point, Kerr argued that Harlan never intended that
there be a separate subjective test. 63 Despite the fact that the test has almost always been described and applied with two parts, Kerr focused on Harlan’s statement in the concurring opinion that the test was “an understanding of the rule that
has emerged from prior decisions.” 64 Harlan “did not intend to create a new test
54. Id.
55. Winn, supra note 46, at 10.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 113 (2015).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 116–22.
62. Id. at 122.
63. Id. at 124.
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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from whole cloth.” 65 Rather, Kerr read Harlan’s oft-quoted paragraph enunciating
the test as three separate sentences: one articulating the test, one explaining the
subjective test, and one explaining the objective test. 66
[1] My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." [2] Thus,
a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. [3] On the other hand, conversations in the open
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. 67
Rather than creating the prongs of a two-part test, and true to Harlan’s assertion that he was not creating a new test, one can read the second sentence as referring to the then-existing line of cases involving a “voluntary exposure of protected spaces” and the third sentence as referring to the then-existing “protectedarea cases.” 68 This explanation is consistent with the language in the second sentence that states that one loses protection in “objects, activities, or statements that
he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders.” 69 This would explain why Harlan referred to this line of cases as “subjective” in nature. It would also explain why he
stated that the “rule . . . has emerged from prior decisions.” 70 In this regard, Harlan’s
subjective test merely restated language from the majority opinion that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” 71 This view is certainly consistent with what Winn and Schneider wrote
about the purely objective nature of the test proposed in the Katz oral arguments
before the Supreme Court. It would also add a great bit of sad irony in explaining
fifty years of misguided judicial interpretation.
Regardless of what may or may not have been intended by Katz, as Dan Solove
has written, “the reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency.” 72 Solove wrote that while the test
promised the flexibility of being able to evolve with and adapt to emerging technologies and societal values, it has “failed to live up to aspirations.” 73 In the years following Katz, the Supreme Court has “adopted a conception of privacy that countless

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Kerr, supra note 59, at 124.
Id. at 123.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Kerr, supra note 59, at 126.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 126 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52).
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511 (2010).
Id. at 1519.
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commentators have found to be overly narrow, incoherent, short-sighted, deleterious to liberty, and totally out of touch with society.” 74 “As Justice Scalia once stated,
‘In my view, the only thing the past three decades have established about the Katz
test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, [reasonable expectations of privacy] bear an uncanny
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.’” 75
Another problem with the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is the
inevitability of shrinking expectations. As Shaun Spencer predicted in 2002, every
time there is an encroachment of privacy, society’s expectations are diminished. 76
So, for example, if employers monitor their employees' telephone or email use while they are in the workplace, they diminish the expectation of
privacy in the workplace. If merchants routinely sell consumers' personal
data, they diminish the expectation of privacy in one's transactional information. And if the Supreme Court holds that law enforcement may review
citizens' bank records without a warrant, it diminishes the societal expectation of privacy in one's bank records. 77
These encroachments occur gradually and just “seem to be the inevitable
price of progress.” 78 Spencer predicted that from time to time, industry or government might go too far with its intrusions into “settled societal expectations” and
that an adjustment or retreat would be necessary. 79
If the Supreme Court were ever to revisit the Katz test and redefine it as the
one-prong, subjective test that it was proposed and intended to be, it could dramatically change the much-distorted notion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” As I do not believe that this re-interpretation is very likely to happen, I will
keep this item fairly low on my list. 80
7. PRIVATE ADOPTION OF FEDERAL STANDARDS
Given the absence of omnibus legislation that dictates specifics regarding protection of personal information, there has been a growing trend in private industry
to adopt some of the best practices of the federal government. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), a federal agency, has been very active in
producing stringent standards for federal agencies regarding security and privacy. 81

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1521 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
76. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L.R. 843
(2002), at https://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/fac_pubs/74/.
77. Id. at 860; see also Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act that Balances
Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 798–99 (2014).
78. Id. at 861.
79. Id. at 866.
80. For purposes of this article, “low” means closer to reason #10 and “high” means closer to
reason #1.
81. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://www.nist.gov/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
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Its Cybersecurity Framework 82 was created to “provide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach, including information
security measures and controls, to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess, and manage cyber risk.” 83 It has been so successful that many
private organizations, while not required to do so, have adopted it.
A recent Gartner study reported that NIST's Cybersecurity Framework is
already used by 30% of U.S organizations. This number is expected to rise
to 50% by 2020. According to a March 2016 survey by Dimensional Research, 70% of these organizations adopted the framework to align themselves with cybersecurity best practices, 29% were required to do so by
business partners, and 28% adopted the framework because of federal
contract requirements. 84
Lee Kim, Director of Privacy and Security at the Healthcare Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS) urged healthcare organizations to adopt NIST’s
Cybersecurity Framework: “it is voluntary and can be applied to virtually all organizations.” 85 “The Framework not only provides technical guidance on how to build a
comprehensive security program, but it also provides suggested methodology for
communicating among internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity
risk.” 86 “The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides guidance on how executives
and non-executives can communicate about cybersecurity risk both inside and outside of the organization.” 87
Similarly, in a document called “Why you should adopt the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework,” PwC urged its clients to adopt the standard:
It is our opinion that the NIST Cybersecurity Framework represents a tipping point in the evolution of cybersecurity, one in which the balance is
shifting from reactive compliance to proactive risk-management standards. While the Framework is voluntary, organizations across industries
may gain significant benefits by adopting the guidelines at the highest possible risk-tolerance level given investment capital. 88

82. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurityframework-021214.pdf. NIST released version 1.1 of the Cybersecurity Framework on April 16, 2018. NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., NIST RELEASES VERSION 1.1 OF ITS POPULAR CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK (Apr. 16,
2018), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2018/04/nist-releases-version-11-its-popular-cybersecurity-framework.
83. Executive Order 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11741 (Feb. 19, 2013).
84. Armand J. Zottola, NIST in the Private Sector, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2878150e-9c01-4c05-b6fd-06dbac58b4f7.
85. Lee Kim, Building Holistic, Robust Security with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, HIMSS
(Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.himss.org/news/building-holistic-robust-security-nist-cybersecurity-framework.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. JIM GUINN, II, PWC, WHY YOU SHOULD ADOPT THE NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 7 (2014),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf.
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In January 2017 Congressman Ralph Abraham introduced a bill that would
strengthen the reach of the Cybersecurity Framework. 89 Among other things, it
would establish a federal working group and a public-private working group “to help
the public and private sector use the framework more effectively.” 90
As more structured approaches to security and privacy emerge—and they will
likely come from governmental bodies, either here or in the European Union—private organizations will be more inclined to adopt them. As private organizations
realize that they are facing more liability for breaches in security or privacy, they
will likely move towards whatever established standards exist in order to be able to
claim adherence to best practices. We are starting to see this happen, and I believe
it will continue to become more and more common.
6. MERGER OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY INTERESTS IN SYSTEM DESIGN
At least since 9/11, privacy and national security often have been viewed as
competing interests. Security can only be achieved at the cost of privacy, and privacy can only be achieved at the cost of security. Security experts often view privacy
as a subpart of security, and privacy experts often view security as a subpart of privacy. Fortunately, there is a growing recognition that, rather than being competing
interests, they are actually complimentary interests, and are often intricately intertwined.
Given the success of NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework, it is not surprising that
NIST followed up with a Privacy Framework. 91 One of NIST’s goals was to “enable
the creation of new systems that mitigate the risk of privacy harm and address privacy risks in a measurable way within an organization’s overall risk management
process.” 92 The Privacy Framework is built upon three objectives, predictability,
manageability, and disassociability “for the purpose of facilitating the development
and operation of privacy-preserving information systems.” 93 The general approach
in designing the Privacy Framework was the same as for the Cybersecurity Framework: to have objectives that would “provide a degree of precision and measurability, so that system designers and engineers, working with policy teams, can use
them to bridge the gap between high-level principles and implementation.” 94
The Privacy Framework acknowledges that while security and privacy are
clearly different, they are often intertwined: “[p]ublic discourse on the relationship
89. Press Release, Abraham Introduces the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Bill (February 28,
2017), https://abraham.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/abraham-introduces-nist-cybersecurityframework-bill.
90. Id.; see also Amber N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford, Janine S. Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A
Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 723–24 (2015).
91. SEAN BROOKS ET AL., NISTIR 8062, AN INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY ENGINEERING AND RISK MANAGEMENT
IN
FEDERAL SYSTEMS, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH. (2017), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf. This was actually a revised version of an initial document. MICHAEL
GARCIA ET AL., PRIVACY RISK MANAGEMENT FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH.
(2015), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-8062/nistir_8062_draft.pdf.
92. INFO. TECH. LAB., NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH., SUMMARY OF THE PRIVACY ENGINEERING WORKSHOP
AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/privacy-workshop-summary-052114.pdf.
93. GARCIA ET AL., supra note 91, at 1.
94. Id. at 21.
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between security and privacy often includes colloquial phrases such as ‘security and
privacy are two sides of a coin’ and ‘there is no privacy without security.’” 95 “Recognizing the boundaries and overlap between privacy and security is key to determining when existing security risk models and security-focused guidance may be
applied to address privacy concerns—and where there are gaps that need to be
filled in order to achieve an engineering approach to privacy.” 96
The privacy principles in the Privacy Framework are built largely upon the requirements enunciated in the Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-130, 97
which were built largely upon the Fair Information Practice Principles first enunciated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973. 98 By presenting
these principles as much as possible as system privacy requirements, NIST attempts
to facilitate a privacy-by-design, engineering approach to building systems that will
be trustworthy and will protect personal information. 99
The Privacy Framework represents the most ambitious attempt to covert fuzzy
privacy principles into quantifiable and measurable system requirements. Inasmuch
as this approach has been very successful regarding Cybersecurity, there is good
reason to believe it will have similar success as this approach evolves and becomes
more widely accepted in both the public and the private realm.
5. NARROWING OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Two Supreme Court cases from the 1970s significantly directed the evolution
of privacy law as it pertained to personal information. In United States v. Miller, the
Supreme Court held that an individual does not have an expectation of privacy in
financial records once he or she has shared them with a bank. 100 Three years later,
in Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that there was no expectation of privacy in a
list of phone numbers that a person has dialed once that list has been shared with
the phone company. 101 This so-called “third-party doctrine” evolved way beyond
what those justices could have possibly envisioned at the dawn of the digital age. It
has proven to be a major obstacle to the protection of personal information. Basically, the doctrine has been interpreted to mean that as soon as someone transmits
data to any third party, he or she has waived any right to limit its distribution or use.
This is, way more often than not, an absurd result, and the doctrine has been rightfully criticized. 102
95. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 91, at 7.
96. Id. at 8.
97. OFFICE MGMT. AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-130 (2016), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/a130revised.pdf.
98. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS:
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 41-42 (1973).
99. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 91, at 1.
100. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
101. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
102. Daniel Solove criticized the doctrine as being ill-suited for today’s data-driven world and as
over-emphasizing the secrecy aspect of privacy: “Life in the modern Information Age often involves exchanging information with third parties, such as phone companies, Internet service providers, cable companies, merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.” Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087,
1152 (2002). Solove has also asked: “Would the Supreme Court really hold that people lack an expectation
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In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the
third-party doctrine in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan. 103 The Court refused to extend the
doctrine to cell-site location information (CSLI) that is generated automatically and
continuously whenever an individual’s phone is turned on. 104 The Court held that
“an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his
physical movements as captured through CSLI.” 105 It recognized that there is a
“world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed
in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of information casually collected
by wireless carriers today.” 106 The Court held that this chronicle of information “implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller,” and refused to extend the doctrine to CSLI. 107 The Court did not, however, provide a
bright-line test for future cases. 108
Four separate dissenting opinions presented a variety of objections, some of
which were focused on traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but some of
which, arguably, provided some hope for the future of data protection. 109 Justice
Thomas questioned the defendant’s interest and ability to object to a search of the
CSLI maintained by the cell phone company, but stated that the “more fundamental
problem with the Court’s opinion, however, is its use of the ‘reasonable expectation
of privacy’ test.” 110 He believed that the Court needs to reconsider the Katz test. 111
Justice Alito began his dissent: “I share the Court’s concern about the effect
of new technology on personal privacy, but I fear that today’s decision will do far
more harm than good.” 112 His dissent focused on two objections: first, that “the
Court ignor[ed] the basic distinction between an actual search . . . and an order
merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified documents,” 113 and second, that “the Court allows a defendant to object to the search
of a third party’s property.” 114 His decision in Carpenter was much anticipated because of his concurring opinion in Jones v. U.S. (which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan), regarding the use of a GPS tracking device. 115 In Jones,

of privacy in their medical information because they convey that information to their physicians? This result
would strike many as absurd.” Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1532
(2010); see also Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441
(2017).
103. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
104. Id. at 2220.
105. Id. at 2219.
106. Id. at 2220.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2221–23.
109. See Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. Online
260 (2018); see also Peter Ormerod and Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73 (2018).
110. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2246–47 (Alito, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2247.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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Justice Alito was very concerned about how new technology could affect expectations of privacy:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately provide significant changes in popular attitudes. 116
He suggested that in “circumstances involving dramatic technological change,
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.” 117
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent provides several instances of optimism for the future
of data privacy protection. First, he appeared ready to abandon the third-party doctrine entirely, agreeing with criticisms like the “third-party-doctrine is not only
wrong, but horribly wrong,” 118 recognizing that people “often do reasonably expect
that information they entrust to third parties, especially information subject to confidentiality agreements, will be kept private,” 119 and stating that the Court has
never provided a persuasive justification for the doctrine. 120
Second, Justice Gorsuch criticized the “often unpredictable—and sometimes
unbelievable—jurisprudence” 121 that has come from the Katz test and warned
about extending it to “data privacy cases.” 122 In criticizing the Court’s lack of direction on how to apply what’s left of the third-party doctrine, he stated that “[a]ll we
know is that historical cell-site location information . . . escapes Smith and Miller’s
shorn grasp, while a lifetime of bank or phone records does not.” 123 “In the Court’s
defense, though, we have arrived at this strange place not because the Court has
misunderstood Katz. Far from it. We have arrived here because this is where Katz
inevitably leads.” 124
Finally, Justice Gorsuch suggested another way of approaching the facts of the
case. First, just because a third party “has access to or possession of your papers
and effects does not necessarily eliminate your interest in them” 125 and “[j]ust because you entrust your data—in some cases, your modern day papers and effects—
to a third party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment protection in its
contents.” 126 Second, he stated that he doubted whether “complete ownership or
exclusive control of property is always necessary to the assertion of a Fourth
Amendment right.” 127 “At least some of this Court’s decisions have already suggested that use of technology is functionally compelled by the demands of modern

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 427.
Id. at 429.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2263.
Id.
Id. at 2266.
Id.
Id. at 2267.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2268.
Id. at 2269.
Id.
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life.” 128 Third, Justice Gorsuch concluded by also calling for legislation: “positive law
may help provide detailed guidance on evolving technologies without resort to judicial intuition. State (or sometimes federal) law often creates rights in both tangible and intangible things.” 129 “If state legislators or state courts say that a digital
record has the attributes that normally make something property, that may supply
a sounder basis for judicial decision-making than judicial guesswork about societal
expectations.” 130
While Carpenter did not overturn the third-party doctrine as it applies to data,
it did provide a majority of justices who recognized that there have been “seismic
shifts in digital technology” 131 since the doctrine arose in the 1970s and refused to
extend it to CSLI. Furthermore, there are several justices who would like to see legislation that addresses privacy data protection and who would like to see the Katz
test revisited.
4. SOCIAL NORMS CONTINUE TO EVOLVE
This is the item that is the most difficult to quantify, yet is most related to and
most intertwined with many of the other items in this list. 132 Ultimately, it is the
most important factor because the strength and prevalence of privacy values and
social norms will determine the extent and scope of data privacy protection.
Ever since Scott McNealy’s and Mark Zuckerberg’s proclamations that privacy
is dead, 133 there has been much discussion about whether people even care about
privacy anymore, and if so, just how much. A number of studies seem to suggest
that, while people say they care about their privacy, they often are unwilling to do
anything to protect it. 134
128. Id. at 2270.
129. Id.
130. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2219.
132. Regarding supra #9 Influence of Contextual Integrity Research, Alice Marwick and danah
boyd describe privacy as a “social construct that reflects the values and norms of individuals within cultures”
and discuss how contextual privacy is key to privacy. Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy:
How Teenagers Negotiate Context in Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051, 1053–54 (2014); see supra
text accompanying notes 27–44. Regarding supra #8 Reinterpretation of the Katz Test, the very nature of
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard is dependent upon social values and norms. See supra text
accompanying notes 45–75. Regarding supra #5 Narrowing of Third Party Doctrine, Carpenter’s narrowing
of the third-party doctrine and the call for legislation are largely a result of the disconnect between society’s
perception of privacy and the law’s treatment of same. See supra text accompanying notes 103–131. Regarding infra #3 Recognition of Trust as Privacy Factor, trust is one of the major factors driving the evolution
of social values and norms. See infra text accompanying notes 155–166. Regarding infra #2 Privacy as Business Strategy, businesses are realizing that consumers’ expectations are changing and are, possibly, willing
to pay for privacy. See infra text accompanying notes 171–185. And regarding infra #1 Peer Pressure—The
European Union and California, people are realizing that they can and should expect more data privacy
protection from the law. See infra text accompanying notes 186–239.
133. Sprenger, supra note 1; Kilpatrick, supra note 2.
134. See Idris Adjerid, Eyal Peer & Alessandro Acquisti, Beyond the Privacy Paradox: Objective versus Relative Risk in Privacy Decision Making, SSRN (April 16, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2765097; see Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy
and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509 (2015); Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John &
George Loewenstein, What Is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2013); SARAH SPIEKERMANN, JENS
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More recent information seems to support Neil Richards’ positions that 1) privacy is not dead, and 2) young people do care about privacy. 135 An Australian study
about privacy in the digital world found that 40 percent of respondents disagreed
with the statement, “[t]here is no privacy, get over it.” 136 People over 70 years old
were the group most likely to agree with that statement. 137 More than half of the
respondents disagreed with the statement, “[c]oncerns about privacy online are exaggerated.” 138 Interestingly, about a third of them were undecided, perhaps suggesting some confusion about the issue. When asked whether they felt that they
could control their privacy online, almost half of 18 to 29 year-olds said they could;
only 34 percent of those over 40 thought that they could. 139 This is certainly consistent with the view that, while younger people have grown up with a different
privacy environment, they are concerned about and take steps to protect their privacy.
In the aftermath of the Facebook debacle involving the use of personal data
Cambridge Analytica, the Pew Research Center found that there is “a renewed focus
on how social media companies collect personal information and make it available
to marketers.” 140 As will be discussed in more detail below, California recently
passed a very extensive privacy law, under threat of an even stricter proposal
planned as a ballot initiative. 141 The “ballot measure had been polling at around 80
percent approval.” 142 The California Assembly approved the measure 69-0 and the
Senate approved it 36-0. 143 “It was a remarkable sea change from last year when
one of the authors of the new bill . . . tried to pass a bill that [was much less rigorous]. That bill didn’t make it out of committee.” 144 There appears to be much more
concern for data protection than there has been in quite some time.
In his classic book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig wrote
that four constraints regulate behavior in cyberspace: the law, social norms, the

GROSSKLAGS & BETTINA BERENDT, E-PRIVACY IN 2ND GENERATION E-COMMERCE: PRIVACY PREFERENCES VERSUS ACTUAL
BEHAVIOR, 38–47 (2001).
135. See generally NEIL M. RICHARDS, FOUR PRIVACY MYTHS (2014).
136. Catherine Hanrahan, Young People Do Care About Privacy, Despite What Mark Zuckerberg
and George Brandis Say, ABC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-27/digital-privacy-surveillance-facebook-young-australians/9179240.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacy-concerns/. Kimberly Houser and Gregory Voss
discussed how Facebook’s share of the social media market dropped after the Cambridge Analytica incident,
likely suggesting that people do care about their privacy. Kimberly Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The
End of Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2018),
https://jolt.richmond.edu/gdpr-the-end-of-google-and-facebook-or-a-new-paradigm-in-data-privacy/.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 218–239.
142. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html.
143. Jessica Guynn, California Passes Nation’s Toughest Online Privacy Law, USA TODAY (June 28,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/06/28/california-lawmakers-pass-tough-new-onlineprivacy-rules-could-model-other-states/743397002/.
144. Id.
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market, and architecture (or code). 145 In describing how social norms can easily be
downplayed when it comes to defining the regulation of privacy, danah boyd and
Alice Marwick stated that “social norms are inherently unstable and constantly
evolving; they vary widely and are difficult to pin down.” 146 They wrote, “[w]hen it
comes to privacy, social norms are evolving, but not disappearing.” 147
Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky questioned the “role of regulation in the absence of stable social norms” 148 when society attempts to address rapid and drastic
changes in technology. “Should restrictions on conduct be based on law or on softer
social norms? Should regulation drive or be driven by volatile individual expectations, market best practices, and social norms? Should we wait for norms to develop
to form societal expectations?” 149 They observed that in the past, “privacy values
and norms took years or even centuries to develop,” 150 but that as “technological
innovation accelerates, so does the need to recalibrate individual expectations, social norms, and, ultimately, laws and regulations.” 151 They stated that “[t]hree main
vectors of influence drive the changes that affect individuals’ perceptions of privacy
and social norms:” businesses, technologies, and individuals. 152
We have seen ever-increasing acceleration from each of these forces since
they wrote their article in 2013. Businesses “are constantly pushing more users to
engage more often and share more data, sometimes pushing against social norms
and challenging traditional values.” 153 Technology continues to push the envelope
with smaller, faster, more powerful, and more invasive devices. And individuals continue to share more and more information as they are tempted by—and generally
satisfied by—all the new and shiny bells and whistles.
Social norms develop over time. Generally, they are molded by advancements
and improvements in technology, along with individuals’ willingness to participate
in new flows of information. Sometimes, however, adjustments are made. Often,
they are a result of outrage. 154 When something like Cambridge Analytica happens,
the public pays more attention to the issues directing those evolving norms. I believe that we are at a time now where those norms are particularly in flux.
3. RECOGNITION OF TRUST AS IMPORTANT PRIVACY FACTOR
In recent years there has been a good bit of research indicating just how important trust is today regarding privacy and the digital world. Neil Richards and
Woodrow Hartzog stated that trust is an “essential ingredient for our digital

145. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 123 (Version 2.0 2006).
146. danah boyd & Alice E. Marwick, Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies, SSRN (Sept. 22, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1925128.
147. Id.
148. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and Shifting Social
Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 71 (2013).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 72.
151. Id. at 73.
152. Id. at 76.
153. Id. at 77.
154. See Jordan M. Blanke, Privacy and Outrage, 9 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1 (2018).
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lives.” 155 “Without trust, people share less information, bad information, or no information at all. They become anxious, bewildered, and suspicious . . . . If people
don’t trust a company, they are more likely to switch to a competitor or resist or
fail to become fully invested in the commercial relationship.” 156 They argued that
“modern privacy law is incomplete because from its inception it has failed to account for the importance of trust.” 157 “One of the bedrock notions of privacy law is
that companies should be transparent about their data collection, use, and disclosure practices so that individuals will be on notice of any potentially worrisome
practices and can tailor their disclosures accordingly.” 158 “Trust need not be exclusively a matter of government policy. Companies can also voluntarily adopt trustenhancing internal policies, safeguards, and organizational schemes . . . . Companies
can delete data when it is no longer needed and collect no more information than
is necessary for the information relationship.” 159
Richards and Hartzog summarized how trust can best be promoted in the context of personal information by describing four characteristics or values that must
exist within our data stewards:
First, trustworthy stewards are honest because they explain to us the
terms under which they hold and use our data. . . .
Second, they are discreet because they treat our data as presumptively
confidential and do not disclose it in ways contrary to our interests or expectations.
Third, trustworthy stewards are protective because they hold the data securely against third parties, doing everything within reason to protect us
from hacks and data breaches.
Fourth, and most fundamentally, those we trust are loyal because they put
our interests ahead of their own short-term potential for gain. 160
Ari Ezra Waldman has written extensively about privacy as trust. 161 He wrote
that “privacy, particularly in the information-sharing context, is really a social construct based on trust between social sharers, between individuals and Internet intermediaries, between groups of people interacting online and offline. . . .” 162 He
believes that trust underlies our most basic notions of privacy. He wrote that at the
155. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 431, 433 (2016).
156. Id. at 435.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 462.
159. Id. at 465.
160. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1214
(2017).
161. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69
U. MIAMI L. REV. 559 (2015) [hereinafter Privacy as Trust]; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The
Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 193 (2016) [hereinafter Privacy, Sharing, and Trust]; Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709 (2017) [hereinafter
Breach of Trust]; see generally ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION
AGE (2018).
162. Privacy as Trust, supra note 161, at 590.
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core of society’s relatively quick response to ban “revenge porn” was the recognition that this represented a flagrant and egregious breach of trust. 163 “Trust is a
resource of social capital between or among two or more persons concerning the
expectations that other members of their community will behave according to accepted norms. It is . . . the belief that others will behave in a predictable manner.” 164
This is yet another example of how it often takes an incident, or a series of incidents,
to illicit public outrage that prompts a legislative or regulatory response. 165
Waldman also wrote about how important trust is to our ever-growing social
networks, most notably, Facebook. He described how Facebook’s model is built almost entirely on trust and about how extensively Facebook manipulates and abuses
that trust. He wrote that Facebook’s platform
not only creates the circumstances for social interaction with those we
trust, it exploits the trust we have in our friends and families for financial
gain by manipulating us into sharing information with third party advertisers . . . [and that] Facebook’s design strategy to leverage trust to manipulate us into clicking on those advertisements should give us pause. Regulators should step in. 166
Facebook keeps trying to push the envelope. It has certainly had opportunities
to cultivate, rather than destroy, public trust—or at least, the perception of trust. It
recovered from a good bit of bad publicity in 2014 regarding its unauthorized experimental with A/B testing. 167 It is now mired in possibly its biggest challenge—to

163. Breach of Trust, supra note 161, at 716.
164. Id.; see also Jordan M. Blanke & Janine S. Hiller, Predictability for Privacy in Data Driven Governments, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 32 (2018).
165. See Jordan M. Blanke, Privacy and Outrage, 9 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1 (2018); see
Jordan M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers’ Requests for Password Disclosure, 14 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 42 (2014).
166. Privacy, Sharing, and Trust, supra note 161, at 196.
167. Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood Manipulation Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-weknow-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/; Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers
With Users’ Emotions in News Feed Experiment, Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirring-outcry.html; Josh Constine, The Morality of A/B Testing, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2014),
https://techcrunch.com/2014/06/29/ethics-in-a-data-driven-world/.
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justify the use of data by Cambridge Analytica to apparently manipulate a presidential election. 168 Mark Zuckerberg publicly acknowledged that this was a “major
breach of trust.” 169
Facebook seems willing to try to get away with as much as it possibly can. In
2016 it vehemently denied using geolocation data to suggest new friends in one’s
news feed. 170 Anecdotally, I recently visited some softball fields on which I played
for many years. Many of my current Facebook friends are former softball buddies.
The day after my visit, at least seven of the first ten suggested friends that popped
up on my Facebook feed were guys with whom I had just spoken in person the day
before. Most of these were people I had not seen in many months and, I don’t believe, had ever appeared in my suggested friends list before.
The growing body of literature about trust suggests that there is finally a basic
understanding that this is an important aspect of our digital lives. Companies will
no longer be able to claim a blind eye with regard to this important factor—and
those that do will likely suffer in the marketplace.
2. PRIVACY AS BUSINESS STRATEGY
In a Harvard Business Review article, Privacy is a Business Opportunity, David
Hoffman wrote a few years ago that “privacy protection should be a practice as
fundamental to the business as customer service. Privacy is an essential element of

168. Can Facebook Restore Public Trust After Cambridge Analytica Scandal?, CBSNEWS (Mar. 24,
2018 4:34 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-restore-public-trust-after-privacy-scandal/; Chris Kahn & David Ingram, Americans Less Likely to Trust Facebook than Rivals on
Personal Data: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2018 8:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-facebook-poll/americans-less-likely-to-trust-facebook-than-rivals-on-personal-data-reuters-ipsos-pollidUSKBN1H10K3; Cyrus Farivar, Facebook Accused of Massive Fraud in New Lawsuit Filed by Cook County,
ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 25, 2018 11:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/03/cook-county-illinoissues-facebook-and-cambridge-analytica-over-data-breach/; Eric Johnson, The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica Apology Tour Continues, With Full-Page Ads in Major Newspapers, RECODE (Mar. 25, 2018 11:36 AM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/3/25/17161262/facebook-cambridge-analytica-apology-ads-newspapersdata-washington-post-new-york-times.
169. Kevin Roose & Sheera Frenkel, Mark Zuckerberg’s Reckoning: ‘This Is a Major Trust Issue’,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/technology/mark-zuckerberg-q-anda.html; Ben Riley-Smith, Mark Zuckerberg ‘Really Sorry’ for Facebook’s ‘Major Breach of Trust’ over Cambridge Analytica Scandal, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 22, 2018 8:51 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/03/21/mark-zuckerberg-breaks-silence-facebook-made-mistakes-cambridge/; Daniel Politi, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Takes Out Full Page Ads to Say “Sorry” for “Breach of Trust”, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2018 12:42
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/facebooks-zuckerberg-takes-out-full-page-ads-to-saysorry-for-breach-of-trust.html.
170. Kashmir Hill, Facebook is Using Your Phone’s Location to Suggest New Friends—Which Could
Be a Privacy Disaster, SPLINTER (June 28, 2016, 1:45 PM), https://splinternews.com/facebook-is-using-yourphones-location-to-suggest-new-f-1793857843; Denver Nicks, Facebook Might Be Using Your Location to
Suggest Friends. Here’s How to Make Sure It Doesn’t, TIME (June 28, 2016, 5:42 PM),
http://time.com/money/4386138/facebook-friend-suggestions-privacy-concerns/; Kate Conger, Facebook
Says It’s Not Making Friend Suggestions Based on Your Location After All, TECHCRUNCH (June 28, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/28/facebook-says-its-not-making-friend-suggestions-based-on-your-location-after-all/; Lauren O’Neil, Is Facebook Using Your Location Data to Suggest ‘People You May Know’?,
CBC (June 28, 2016, 9:41 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/facebook-gps-location-data-new-friendspeople-you-may-know-1.3656555.
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being a good business partner.” 171 He stated that many corporate boardrooms are
now discussing “what should be done to integrate privacy as an added value to the
business.” 172 He stated that it had been estimated “that brand value represents
nearly one-third of the $12 trillion in market capitalization of the S&P 500.” 173
“When an incident related to privacy occurs, it is a direct blow to the brand’s esteem
and its financial value.” 174 This has certainly been the case recently with Facebook
losing an estimated $50-60 billion in value in a matter of days as a result of the
Cambridge Analytica episode. 175
Hoffman wrote that the “shift to a fundamentally digital economy means that,
regardless of the sector you are in, your ability to protect individuals will distinguish
your company from competitors who have taken a passive approach or who ignore
their responsibilities.” 176 He predicted that in the near-future, “some healthcare
provider will surely earn a reputation among consumers and within the industry as
the company that takes the greatest care to protect their patients’ information.” 177
He predicted similar results in other sectors.
In a recent white paper entitled Revitalizing Privacy and Trust in a Data-Driven
World, PwC summarized some if its findings from The Global State of Information
Security Survey 2018. 178 Among its nine insights on data privacy and trust were:
“The challenge for CEOs is going beyond awareness to action,” “[b]eyond confidentiality, privacy expectations focus on data use,” and “[c]onsumers will vote for responsible innovation and data use with their wallets.” 179
Regarding the first item, PwC reported that “[t]here is some cause for optimism . . . 87% of global CEOs say they are investing in cybersecurity to build trust
with customers. Nearly as many (81%) say they are creating transparency in the
usage and storage of data.” 180 Regarding the second item, PwC stated that “data
privacy is becoming more about controlling how data is used.” 181 It noted that NIST
included the goal of “disassociability” in its recent Privacy Framework and that the
EU’s GDPR emphasized both privacy by design and data minimization. 182
Regarding the third item, PwC contended that “[c]onsumers do put a monetary value on privacy—but context matters. It may seem paradoxical when consumers voice privacy concerns while still providing personal data online, but this does

171. David Hoffman, Privacy is a Business Opportunity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/04/privacy-is-a-business-opportunity.
172. Id.
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175. Romain Dillet, Facebook Has Lost $60 Billion in Value TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 20, 2018),
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Value Destruct-o-Meter: $50 Billion and Counting, QUARTZ (Mar. 20, 2018), https://qz.com/1233816/facebook-has-lost-50-billion-in-market-value-over-the-past-two-days/.
176. Hoffman, supra note 171.
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178. PWC, REVITALIZING PRIVACY AND TRUST IN A DATA-DRIVEN WORLD 1 (2018),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cybersecurity/assets/revitalizing-privacy-trust-in-data-driven-world.pdf.
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not mean consumers do not value privacy.” 183 It discussed the work of Alessandro
Acquisti, whose “research suggests that privacy preferences are shaped by context
as opposed to being absolute.” 184 The report stated that “consumers will pay more
for technology products that are designed with security and privacy in mind.” In its
summary, among the things that PwC urged leaders to do were “prioritize data-use
governance” and “view GDPR as an opportunity . . . to align their organizations to
where they need to be for future success, not merely for compliance but rather for
strategic risk management.” 185
This recognition by corporate leadership that privacy is important and can be
used for strategic advantage is long overdue. As more businesses recognize the dangers of ignoring its consumers concerns about their data, we will see a major growth
in an attempt to “sell privacy.” More companies will invest in best practices to protect data and to inform their customers exactly what and why they are doing. As
the PwC report noted, with the GDPR having recently come into effect, there has
never been a better time for companies to become serious about protecting data.
1. PEER PRESSURE—THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CALIFORNIA
A. The European Union
The much-anticipated General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union became effective on May 25, 2018, 186 basically replacing the Data
Directive of 1995. 187 It is the most aggressive attempt anywhere to provide for the
protection of personal data. It contains many significant changes that appear likely
to have, in many cases, worldwide effect.
Any company that wants to continue doing business globally—and that includes doing business in the EU or having customers, suppliers, or other contacts
who reside in the EU—will have to make changes to its past practices. The scope of
the GDPR includes the processing of the personal data of any EU resident, regardless of where that data may actually be stored and processed. 188 Any company that
does business with or in the EU will have to pay attention to the new regulations.
Companies will have to decide if it is worth maintaining different policies and
practices for EU residents and for non-EU residents. I do not think it will be. For
most large companies, it will be easier just to adopt GDPR-friendly practices across
the board. Obviously, this would be a major bonus for residents of the United
States—and elsewhere—when it comes to protecting personal data.
183. Id. at 14.
184. PWC, supra note 178, at 14; see Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, The
Economics of Privacy, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 29 (2016); see also Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte &
George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509 (2015).
185. PWC, supra note 182, at 15–16.
186. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/ (EC) (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1
(hereinafter “GDPR”); see also W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L. J. (forthcoming 2019).
187. Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EC).
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At the heart of the GDPR is its Article 5: Principles relating to processing of
personal data:
1. Personal data shall be:
(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the
data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’);
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; . . . (‘purpose limitation’);
(c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’);
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; . . . (‘accuracy’);
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are
processed; . . . (‘storage limitation’);
(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal
data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and
against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical
or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’). 189
These principles are based upon, and are the most rigorous manifestation of,
the principles first enunciated in the FIPPs (1973), 190 then in the OECD Guidelines
(1980), 191 the EU Data Protection Directive (1995), 192 and most recently, for federal
agencies, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130 (2016). 193 Some of
the trickle-down effects of the GDPR will likely provide the greatest amount of data
protection that U.S. residents have ever had.
A major change under the GDPR is a return to one of the cornerstone principles of the FIPPS—a true and legitimate consent. 194 Consent must be a “freely given,
specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes . . . by a
statement or by clear affirmative action signif[ying] agreement to the processing of
personal data.” 195 If consent is obtained by a written document that also concerns
any other matter, the “request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is
clearly distinguishable from other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible
189.
190.

Id. at 35–36.
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192. Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EC).
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form, using plain and clear language.” 196 This means that the request for consent
can no longer be in fine print or legalese, and there can no longer be pre-checked
boxes or opt-in consent. Furthermore, consent can be withdrawn at any time. 197
Once there is consent, and according to the principles of Article 5, the data
shall be “processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner,” 198 “collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner
that is incompatible manner,” 199 “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary” for the specified purposes, 200 “accurate and . . . kept up to date,” 201 and “kept
in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than necessary.” 202 This marks a sea change in how data would be processed in the United
States.
Additionally, without specific consent, the processing “of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or
trade union membership, and the processing of generic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or orientation shall be prohibited.” 203 Member states would be able to further restrict or limit the processing of “genetic data,
biometric data or data concerning health.” 204
Individuals will have the right to access their personal data held by controllers, 205 will have the right to have inaccurate information corrected, 206 will have the
right to have personal data erased “without undue delay” 207 if the data is “no longer
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected. . . or processed,” 208 or if the individual withdraws consent, 209 or if the data “ha[s] been unlawfully processed.” 210
Furthermore, an individual may object to the processing of data used for purposes of direct marketing and the practice of profiling to the extent that it is used
for direct marketing. 211 When an individual objects to the use of personal data for
direct marketing purposes, “the personal data shall no longer be processed for such
purposes.” 212 The individual also has “the right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” 213
196.
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The GDPR will apply to the processing of personal data of residents of the EU
“regardless of whether the processing takes place in the [EU] or not.” 214 In order to
continue to do business with, and maintain personal data on EU residents, companies around the world will have to make drastic changes to their current policies
and practices.
While many U.S. companies have already made changes to their privacy policies, 215 it remains to be seen just how much of the GDPR they actually adopt. There
are many far-reaching requirements of GDPR that appear highly unlikely to be followed by U.S. companies. While some basic provisions will probably be modeled, it
will be surprising if many companies adopt all of the GDPR. For example, in a statement made recently before Congress, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg appeared to say
that Facebook would abide by the new law 216 but later seemed to backtrack from
that statement. 217
Even if companies were to adopt the basic principles relating to the processing
of data, as described above—which would be in and of itself an enormous change
for most companies—it would be hard to imagine adoption of some of the more
far-reaching requirements related to access, correction, erasure, and retention of
data. Furthermore, it is unlikely that some of the restrictions on the use of data for
direct marketing and profiling purposes would be widely adopted voluntarily.
B. California
Shortly after the GDPR became effective, California adopted a rigorous new
law that incorporates many of the same basic principles: The California Consumer
Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) becomes effective on January 1, 2020. 218 The bill was
passed unanimously by the California legislature under threat of a stricter law that
was being planned for submission as a ballot initiative that “had been polling at
around 80 percent approval.” 219 High tech companies “Google, Facebook, Verizon,
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Comcast and AT&T each contributed $200,000 to a committee opposing the proposed ballot measure, and lobbyists had estimated that businesses would spend
$100 million to campaign against it before the November election.” 220 There is still
concern that those same groups will use the time before the law becomes effective
to “water it down.” 221
The CCPA will give Californians far greater protection for their personal information than anywhere else in the United States. Californians will have “the right to
request that a business that collects . . . personal information disclose . . . the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business has collected.” 222
A business that collects . . . personal information, shall, at or before the
point of collection, inform . . . as to the categories of personal information
to be collected and the purposes for which the categories of personal information shall be used. A business shall not collect additional categories
of personal information or use personal information collected for additional purposes without providing . . . notice. 223
“Personal information” is defined as “information that identifies, relates to,
describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.” 224 It includes, but is
not limited to a “real name, alias, postal address, unique personal identifier, online
identifier Internet Protocol address, email address, account name, social security
number, driver’s license number, passport, or similar identifiers.” 225
Californians will have the right to request a business to delete personal information that has been collected about them. 226 They will be able to request that a
business disclose to them the categories of personal information it has collected,
the categories of sources from which the personal information is collected, the business or commercial purposes for collecting or selling the personal information, the
categories of third parties with whom the business shares the personal information,
and the specific pieces of personal information it has collected. 227 They will be able
to make similar requests about personal information that was sold to third parties
by the business. 228
Californians will have the right to opt out from the sale of their personal information to third parties. 229 Additional restrictions may apply when individuals are
less than 16 years of age. 230 Businesses will not be able to discriminate against those
making requests under the law by denying goods or services, or charging different
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. A.B. 375, 2017–18 St. Assemb., at 1798.100 (a) (Cal. 2018).
223. Id. at 1798.100 (b).
224. Id. at 1798.140 (o)(1).
225. Id. at 1798.140 (o)(1)(A).
226. Id. at 1798.105 (a). The business is not required to comply with the request for a number of
specified reasons. A.B. 375, 2017–18 St. Assemb., at 1798.105 (d) (Cal. 2018).
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prices, or providing a different level or quality of goods or services, 231 unless the
”difference is reasonably related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s data.” 232 Businesses will be able to “offer financial incentives, including
payments to consumers as compensation, for collection of personal information,
the sale of personal information, or the deletion of personal information.” 233 A business will only be able to enter a consumer into a financial incentive program with
prior opt-in consent 234 and cannot use a program that is “unjust, unreasonable, coercive, or usurious in nature.” 235
The law will require businesses to “[m]ake available to consumers two or more
designated methods for submitting requests for information required to be disclosed . . . including, at a minimum, a toll-free telephone number, and if the business
maintains an Internet Web site, a Web site address.” 236 It will require that certain
information about the law be included in a business’s online privacy policy. 237 The
law will also require that a business which sells personal information “[p]rovide a
clear and conspicuous link on the business’ Internet homepage, titled ‘Do Not Sell
My Personal Information,’ to an Internet Web page that enables a consumer, or a
person authorized by the consumer, to opt out of the sale of the consumer’s personal information.” 238 A business will not be able to “require a consumer to create
an account in order to direct the business not to sell the consumer’s personal information.” 239
It will be interesting to see if special interest groups will be able to water down
the requirements of the law as it now stands. California has certainly raised the bar
for data protection in the United States. It will also be interesting to see how many
other states use this law as a model for legislation.
II. CONCLUSION
The last several items on this list, particularly the evolution of societal privacy
norms and values, the recognition of the importance of trust as a privacy factor, the
realization that privacy can be used as a successful business strategy, and the EU
and California legislation, have provided a climate that is probably as conducive for
change in privacy laws as it has been since prior to 9/11. Hopefully there is enough
energy from these factors to push the evolution of data privacy protection in a new
direction. Only time will tell.
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